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Abstract 
This Response to Professors Levin, Jacobs, and Arora’s article 
To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the 
State Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and 
Third Parties? focuses on their claim that the law governing 
religious exemptions to medical neglect is messy, unprincipled, 
and in need of reform, including because it violates the 
Establishment Clause. I disagree with this assessment and 
provide support for my position. Specifically, I summarize and 
assess the current state of this law and its foundation in the 
perennial tussle between parental rights and state authority to 
make decisions for and about the child. Because these are featured 
as examples in their work, I also summarize and assess the 
current state of the law on vaccinations and male circumcision. I 
conclude with some thoughts on Levin, Jacobs, and Arora’s 
provocative suggestion that the law governing religious 
exemptions to medical neglect (as reformed according to their 
terms) might provide a template for addressing other 
accommodation claims such as those of religiously-motivated 
opponents of gay marriage. 
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I. Introduction 
There is no dearth of legal scholarship on the subject of 
religiously-motivated medical neglect. Much of that scholarship 
focuses on the federal government’s brief insistence in the period 
1974 to 1983 that the states provide statutory exemptions to such 
neglect, and on the effects of those exemptions even as the 
government withdrew its mandate.1 But the best of it transcends 
that historical moment and examines the phenomenon in its 
broader political and doctrinal context.2 The central question in 
this context is generally, who decides for the child who, because of 
her infancy, cannot decide for herself? More specifically, who 
decides her religion and how she will be treated when she is ill or 
injured? Our society’s related commitments to liberalism and 
pluralism assure that the answer always starts with her parents; 
to the extent scholars have disagreed amongst themselves, it has 
only been about how much liberty parents have and should have, 
                                                                                                     
 1.  See generally, e.g., Wayne F. Malecha, Faith Healing Exemptions to 
Child Protection Laws: Keeping the Faith versus Medical Care for Children, 12 
J. LEGIS. 243 (1985); Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: 
Procedural Due Process and the Effect of Faith Healing Exceptions on the 
Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 43 (1994); Rita Swan, 
On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to Medical Care: Can This 
Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73 (1998); see also infra 
note 76 (discussing the statutory and regulatory history). 
 2.  See generally, e.g., SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, WHEN PRAYER FAILS: FAITH 
HEALING, CHILDREN, AND THE LAW (2008); James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment 
Exemptions to Child Medical Neglect Laws: What We Outsiders Should Think, 
76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 147 (2000); James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: 
Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal 
Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321 (1996); 
Walter Wadlington, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Medical Decision Making 
for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 311 (1994). 
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and then about when and on what grounds the state properly 
intervenes to replace them as decision makers. 
In this respect, Professors Levin, Jacobs, and Arora’s article, 
To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the 
State Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and 
Third Parties?,3 is different; it focuses not on the political and 
doctrinal boundaries of parents’ liberty—indeed, it is largely 
devoid of this discussion—but rather examines the law’s 
treatment of religiously-motivated medical neglect as an aspect of 
its treatment of religion more generally.4 This take on the subject 
from Law and Religion is a welcome addition to a literature that 
is otherwise typically bent against accommodations and missing 
the intellectual respect and multidisciplinary sophistication the 
Authors bring to the table. Their take is also interesting because 
it situates parental decision-making about the treatment of 
illness and injury within the broader literature on tolerance,5 and 
because it highlights how much more carefully religiously-
motivated parents may be accommodated than other religiously-
motivated claimants.6 The perspectives and reflections afforded 
                                                                                                     
 3.  73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 913 (forthcoming 2016). This Article follows 
from Professor Levin’s earlier work, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political 
Power, 48 U.C.D. L. REV. 1617, 1617 (2015), in which he argues against “the 
dominant view . . . that courts are indispensable for protecting religious 
minority groups from oppression by the majority”; and from Professor Jacobs 
and Arora’s earlier work, Ritual Male Infant Circumcision and Human Rights, 
15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 30 (2015). 
 4.  Framed as it is, the Authors’ article is about more than accommodation 
of medical neglect, of course. But, as I read it, this is its principal focus. It is also 
the area in which I have some expertise and so it is also the focus of this 
Response. Throughout, I use the term “medical neglect” both technically, to 
describe this particular area of the law which is a sub-set of maltreatment law, 
and more generally, to describe the set of fact patterns which are of concern to 
the Authors. These include medical neglect cases, but also vaccination cases 
(which are neglect in the absence of an exemption) and circumcision cases 
(which could theoretically be characterized as maltreatment, but as abuse not 
neglect). The Authors themselves speak of “religious practices” and 
“accommodations” that “impose health-related harm to children within a 
religious group or to third parties.” See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note 3, at 913, 
963. 
 5.  See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: 
Multicultural Sensitivity and Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717 (1998) 
(providing a similar analysis, but with immigrant parenting practices). 
 6.  See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note 3, at 913, 919–45 (supporting their 
principal argument—that accommodations law in general is messy and 
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by these approaches have the potential to be illuminating and 
generative both within and outside of Law and Religion.  
The fact that the Authors are interested in bringing theory to 
bear on practice, and that they have the tools to do so, is also 
welcome. Unfortunately, this aspect of their otherwise promising 
project falls short in this case. It falls short because it proceeds 
largely without regard to the extensive body of law and 
scholarship already on the particular subject of medical neglect, 
and because it ignores that parents are special individuals in 
American political philosophy and law so that the harm principle 
that otherwise governs the outcome of cases involving the limits 
on tolerance and religious accommodations reads differently in 
this context. The analysis that follows focuses on these two 
issues.  
Part I summarizes the Authors’ arguments and proposals. 
Part II offers a critique from family and children’s law. This 
critique is primarily of their doctrinal work, which, I argue, 
causes them to assume that current law is different than it is and 
in need of reform, when in fact it largely mirrors their proposal. 
In the course of developing this point, Part II provides an up-to-
date survey of the law’s accommodation of religiously-motivated 
medical neglect, including religious opposition to vaccination 
mandates and the challenge to male circumcision. My Response 
concludes with a reflection on the Authors’ suggestion that 
medical neglect law may provide a model for evaluating the 
merits of other kinds of accommodation claims including those 
touching on religious opposition to same sex marriage. 
II. To Accommodate or Not 
In To Accommodate or Not, the Authors make two principal 
arguments and two proposals. 
First, they argue that the law that applies when “religious 
practices . . . impose health-related harm to children within a 
religious group or to third parties” is “inconsistent” and that this 
situation exists because “legislators, courts, scholars, ethicists, 
                                                                                                     
unprincipled—with examples that feature the accommodation of religiously-
motivated medical neglect against a backdrop of political and judicial decisions 
denying accommodations in other areas). 
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and medical practitioners have not offered a consistent way to 
analyze” the cases.7 In support of this argument, they summarize 
the history of constitutional and statutory “expressions of 
accommodationism” in general, emphasizing shifts in degrees of 
respect for religiously-motivated conduct over time, across fact 
patterns, and depending on the government (federal or state) and 
branch of government (primarily judiciary or legislature) doing 
the accommodating.8 Notably, this support does not involve an 
analysis of medical neglect law. 
Second, the Authors argue that this “lack of consistency is a 
troubling artifact of our political system” which “raises serious 
constitutional questions that lie at the intersection of the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.”9 
They say they accept that interests balancing—particularly that 
which involves a balancing of harms—is appropriate and even 
necessary in this area.10 They also say they accept the facts of our 
federalism; in their words, that especially in “a multi-ethnic, 
multi-cultural, and multi-jurisdictional society such as ours,” 
interests balancing will “produce varying policies” since “different 
policymakers and communities may balance the interests 
differently in specific cases,”11 so that “[d]ifferences in the 
accommodation of claims for different sorts of religious 
accommodations are not in themselves surprising or necessarily 
troubling.”12 But, they insist, “there seem to be no principles at 
                                                                                                     
 7.  Id. at 913. 
 8.  See generally id. at 919–45 (discussing the accommodation debate from 
scholarly, statutory, and constitutional perspectives). 
 9.  Id. at 913–14. 
 10. Id. at 946 (noting, for example, that “the liberal values that require 
society to protect human life and impose an absolute ban on private killings 
easily supersede the values favoring individual religious freedom”). For 
instance, they accept that “laws that decline to accommodate religious objectors 
can be understood as principled efforts to balance the benefits of religious 
liberty against its costs.” Id. 
 11. Id. at 946–47 
 12. Id. at 945; see also id. at 937 (noting that “[o]ur federalist structure 
allows different states to preserve their different characters.”) Unfortunately, 
this acknowledgement does not appear to guide the Authors’ analysis going 
forward, as much of what they describe as inconsistent in the context of medical 
neglect law is in fact the result of federalism. Different states have adopted 
different approaches to what have traditionally been state law matters, 
including the regulation of the family and of medicine. See infra notes 17, 54, 
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play in the degree to which we permit or limit religious freedom 
in individual cases,”13 and this is troubling because the First 
Amendment demands principled balancing. 
Specifically on the point that the law’s approach to religious 
accommodations is unprincipled, the Authors point out that 
“[s]ometimes we allow religious groups to impose significant costs 
and harms on third parties”14 and in other cases “statutes or 
regulations prohibit the exercise of religious freedom”15 in 
circumstances that exhibit “no regard for the value of religious 
liberty despite the absence of documented harm to any 
individual.”16  
[C]onsider for instance, parents who refuse to vaccinate their 
children against deadly diseases for reasons of religion, thus 
putting at grave risk both their own children and other 
children who cannot be successfully vaccinated. Or consider 
parents who are shielded by law from criminal charges when 
they withhold necessary medical treatment from their children 
for religious reasons. Here we seem to have embraced an 
extreme degree of religious liberty that ignores severe harms 
to children and third parties. 
On the other hand, sometimes statutes or regulations prohibit 
the exercise of religious freedom even when there is little or no 
harm to anyone. Consider, for example, the plaintiff in 
[Employment Division v.] Smith, who wished to use controlled 
substances as part of his religious worship ceremonies but was 
denied even though the Government could articulate no third 
party harms, or even harms to the people who used the drugs 
in their rituals.17 
                                                                                                     
74–85 and accompanying text (highlighting the points that struck me in this 
regard). I acknowledge that this critique may be misplaced if what the Authors 
intended was merely to note that the accommodation of medical neglect 
(including vaccination exemptions) is much broader than (and thus inconsistent 
with) the accommodation of other religious claims. I took them at their word, 
however, that they also see medical neglect law itself as internally inconsistent. 
Supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 13.  Levin et al., supra note 3, at 948. 
 14.  Id. at 948–49. 
 15.  Id. at 949. 
 16.  Id. at 950. 
 17.  Levin et al., supra note 3, at 949 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990)). The authors also cite Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015), 
which they describe as involving “a prisoner who wished to grow a beard of one 
half inch in length to comply with his religious beliefs but was denied for 
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The Authors explain this inconsistency using “basic insights” 
from public choice theory,18 namely that “religious groups operate 
in the political marketplace like other interest 
groups . . . . [W]hether they win or lose on a particular political 
issue is related less to a principled balancing of the competing 
underlying values than it is to the political dynamics in play.”19 
But, they argue, “we should demand more than ‘politics as usual’ 
in the context of religious accommodations that potentially harm 
children or third parties” because “both sides of the equation 
implicate constitutional values.”20 
On this constitutional point, the Authors explain their view 
that the relationship between the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses requires both that 
“individuals and groups not be prevented from practicing their 
religious obligations as a result of bias, animus, or stereotyping 
on the part of lawmakers and officials” and that accommodations 
do not cause harm to “children and third parties . . . who do not 
choose to subject themselves to the same religious strictures.”21 
                                                                                                     
reasons so transparently baseless that Supreme Court Justices laughed at 
them.” Id. 
 18.  Id. at 950. 
 19.  Id. at 960. 
 20.  Id. at 964. Critiquing this aspect of the Authors’ analysis is not the 
focus of my Response, but it bears noting that to support their central premise 
that the law’s approach to religious accommodations is inconsistent and 
unprincipled, in effect the Authors take an aerial, forest-through-the trees view 
of their subject which blurs the law’s essential details. This view assumes away 
history, in particular the evolution of the Supreme Court’s fundamental rights 
analysis; and it assumes away federalism, the separation of powers, and the 
standard relevance of case facts. In other words, the way the Authors propose to 
support their claim that the law in this area is “unprincipled” is by assuming 
away the very principles that make sense of its apparent messiness. See, e.g., 
supra notes 8, 12, 17 and accompanying text (providing examples of these 
erasures). For me, at least, this analytical move is not remedied by the Authors’ 
alternative story, that the dissatisfactory state of accommodations law can be 
explained using public choice theory. Although this story is surely right as to 
some accommodations—for example, I agree that religious exemptions to 
medical neglect laws are illustrative here—it is ultimately unnecessary because 
it does not do any work that is not already done by federalism and separation 
powers principles: different jurisdictions sometimes weigh harms differently and 
choose different approaches, and the three branches of government within a 
jurisdiction sometimes approach the issue differently given their different 
sources of authority and responsibilities. 
 21.  Id. at 964. To support this proposition, the Authors cite Levin, 
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The Authors offer a three-part test “[t]o resolve these 
problems”22 that “balances the competing interests . . . according 
to the yin and yang of the First Amendment Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses.”23 The test is designed “to determine 
whether . . . [a] religious practice should be accommodated by 
legislators, courts, and medical practitioners.”24 In essence, the 
test provides that the government “may restrict” religious 
practices that “creat[e] a substantial chance of death or major 
disruption of a physiological function or . . . major psychological 
morbidity” to in-group members, or that “create[] unreasonable 
burdens” to out-group members including to “society as a 
whole.”25 It further provides that the government “has a 
constitutional obligation to limit the practice” if its effects are 
“severe.”26 Finally, it sets out a non-discrimination provision that 
would prohibit the government from restricting religious 
practices which cause “harms of a similar magnitude” to those of 
“tolerate[d] . . . comparable mainstream practices.”27 This same 
provision would require the government to restrict religious 
                                                                                                     
Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3. They note that at 
page 1655 Levin “discuss[es] the line of cases interpreting the Establishment 
Clause to limit the accommodation of religious practices that harm third 
parties.” Levin et al., supra note 3, at 964 n.246. But none of the “third parties” 
in those cases are children burdened by their parents’ religious practices. See 
Levin, supra note 3, at 1655 n.184 (citing only to cases involving impermissible 
discrimination among religions and impermissible burdens on third party 
outsiders). And the Authors do not explain how they relate to the 
constitutionally different factual setting that is the parent-child relationship, 
which does not contemplate children as third parties vis à vis their parents. See 
infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (further discussing this point). 
 22.  Levin et al., supra note 3, at 914. 
 23.  Id. at 965. 
 24.  Id. at 914. 
 25. Id. at 966. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 966–67. The Authors provide infant circumcision as an example 
of such a prohibition:  
[I]f a society tolerates infant circumcision performed by a doctor in 
hospitals for non-religious reasons, it must also tolerate religious 
Jews’ practice of home infant circumcision performed by a trained 
mohel (Jewish circumciser) unless the risks associated with this 
religious practice are of greater magnitude than those associated with 
the non-religious practice. 
Id. at 989. 
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practices that cause severe harms if it prohibits mainstream 
practices that cause those harms.28 
 
Finally, with some equivocation,29 and without developing 
the point in any real detail,30 the Authors suggest that their 
medical neglect test “has potential implications for a wide range 
of clashes between law and religion[,]”31 including for “the debate 
over whether sexual orientation non-discrimination laws should 
accommodate religious dissent.”32 
III. A Critique from Family and Children’s Law 
The focus of my critique of the Authors’ work from family and 
children’s law is both doctrinal and normative. It centers first on 
their claims about the Establishment Clause and then on their 
claims about the state of medical neglect law. Because their 
proposed test is based on these claims, its merits are also 
considered. In the process, I provide an up-to-date summary of 
the law applicable to religiously-motivated medical neglect. 
                                                                                                     
 28. See id. (noting that “society cannot simultaneously tolerate comparable 
mainstream practices—religious or not—that impose similar harms”). 
 29. See id. at 1007 (noting, for example, that “while we do not discount the 
possibility that the test could play a guiding role in deciding such cases, the 
matter requires further consideration”). 
 30.  The Authors devote approximately two pages to what is ultimately 
their most provocative argument, that the medical neglect test might be 
extrapolated to the “debate over whether sexual orientation non-discrimination 
laws should accommodate religious dissent.” Id. at 914; see also id. at 1006–08 
(discussing this argument). In those pages, beyond referring back to their test 
and saying that interests balancing would be at issue, they do not detail how 
this would work or otherwise discuss the legal and policy implications of this 
particular proposed application. See id. at 1008 (discussing only “kinds of 
compromises [that] are reasonable attempts to balance the values of pluralism 
and religious freedom against those of monism and the protection of the 
interests of third parties in a manner compatible with the mandates of the 
religion clauses”). 
 31.  Id. at 1006. 
 32.  Id. at 914, 1006–08. 
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A. The Establishment Clause and Medical Neglect Law 
To the extent the Authors are making doctrinal as opposed to 
normative claims, they err in their suggestions that the 
Establishment Clause (1) disallows accommodations that would 
cause harm to “children . . . who do not choose to subject 
themselves to the same religious strictures,”33 and (2) requires 
the government affirmatively to intervene to protect children 
from serious harm that could result from religiously-motivated 
medical neglect.34  
As to the former, the law of parental autonomy is clear that, 
aside from a few notable exceptions, children do not have the 
capacity to make choices of legal consequence, including about 
religion and medical treatment; their parents are formally 
charged with the right and responsibility to make these decisions 
in their place.35 As a result, a child cannot choose legally to 
subject themselves or not to particular religious strictures. Their 
parents’ choices are formally theirs, meaning their parents’ 
religion is formally theirs; the law has adopted the legal fiction 
that the parents’ choice is the child’s choice. Thus, again 
doctrinally-speaking, it is not, as the Authors suggest, a 
prohibited establishment of religion for the state to recognize the 
                                                                                                     
 33.  Id. at 964. 
 34.  Id. at 966. 
 35. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000) (reaffirming the 
longstanding constitutional “presumption that fit parents act in their children’s 
best interests); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 623 (1979) (establishing parents’ 
Fourteenth Amendment right to make medical decisions for their children and 
describing the best interests presumption and its operation); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (generally describing parents’ rights to 
determine their children’s religion and pre-majority lives and the limits of state 
authority in those respects); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165–66 
(1944) (noting parents’ right to provide children with religious training); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (first establishing parental rights, 
including “the right of the individual . . . to . . . establish a home and bring up 
children” and “to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience,” as 
being within the liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also 
Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature 
Minors to Consent to General Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786, 788–89 
(Apr. 2013) (summarizing the law of parental autonomy as it relates to medical 
decision-making for children, including mature minors); Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 545–559 
(2007) (describing the boundaries of parents’ consent authority). 
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parents’ religion as also being the child’s religion. Indeed, I think 
it is fair to say both that because children are not third parties in 
the parent-child relationship the Establishment Clause is not at 
issue here,36 and that it is unlikely that the Court would seriously 
entertain a different interpretation that conflicted with its 
parental autonomy jurisprudence. 
As to the latter, the law is clear both that the Establishment 
Clause permits the government to privilege religion, just not any 
particular religion,37 and that it does not contemplate affirmative 
action on the government’s part of the sort the Authors imagine.38 
                                                                                                     
 36. To the extent the Establishment Clause has been relevant in parents’ 
rights cases to date, it has tended to be in two categories. The first comprise 
cases in which the claim is made that a public school’s actions or requirements 
favor or burden a particular religion. See generally, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992) (considering a religious sermon at a public school graduation). 
The second comprise cases involving religious exemptions to medical neglect 
laws, which, as written, appear to privilege Christian Scientists or some other 
particular religious group. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 875 
(Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J., concurring) (“The one group of parents squarely protected 
by the terms of the statute are Christian Scientists, whose denomination 
sponsored the 1976 amendment to section 270 enacting its religious 
exemption.”).  
 37. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 717–25 (2004) (noting that the 
“play in the joints” between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses 
“permit[s] . . . but [does] not require[]” the states to accommodate religion in an 
otherwise neutral context); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1983) (finding 
that the Establishment Clause “affirmatively mandates accommodation, not 
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any”); Larson v. 
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment 
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another.”). 
 38. The Authors write that “[t]he Supreme Court has suggested that legal 
tolerance or accommodation of religious practices that impose third-party harms 
potentially violate the Establishment Clause.” Levin et al., supra note 3 at 991 
(citing Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3, at 
1655 (emphasis added). They apparently rely on this in the development of their 
medical neglect test, which provides in part that the government “has a 
constitutional obligation to limit the practice” if its effects are “severe.” Id. at 
966 (citing Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3, 
at 1657). That the government has no federal constitutional obligation 
affirmatively to intervene to protect children from parental maltreatment was 
specifically established in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social 
Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Although DeShaney was decided on Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty grounds, id. at 203, there is no indication there or elsewhere 
that the outcome would have been different had the case arisen instead on First 
Amendment Establishment Clause grounds. Apart from the factual points that 
make this unlikely—mostly having to do with the public duty doctrine, agency 
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Most specifically, although there is excellent scholarship on the 
point that equal protection doctrine might be marshalled in favor 
of a requirement that government treat children of religious 
parents as it treats children of non-religious parents,39 neither 
the Equal Protection Clause nor the Establishment Clause have 
been successfully used toward this end.40 The phenomenon that 
results—children of religious parents who are not protected by 
the state from suspected maltreatment to the same extent as 
children of non-religious parents—is well known amongst 
children’s law scholars and lawyers who practice in the field.41 It 
is part of the constitutional scheme that has caused scholars to 
describe children—in effect pre-autonomous individuals—as “the 
Achilles heel of liberalism.”42 
Ultimately, the Authors appear to be reading the religion 
clauses to include novel or non-traditional anti-discrimination 
norms: norms that would erase the distinctions between the 
autonomy afforded to (or recognized as existing in) children and 
adults, and between religiously- and other-motivated 
individuals.43 If I am right to read the work this way, I am both 
                                                                                                     
discretion, and the fisc—there is also a dearth of law on the point that the 
Establishment Clause imposes any affirmative obligation on the government 
unless it is to remedy an existing violation of the Clause. Cf. Salazar v. Buono, 
559 U.S. 700, 750 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the 
Establishment Clause may “impose affirmative obligations that may require a 
State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or 
endorsing a [particular] private religious message”). This is not the case here, 
where, consistent with Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the government 
has chosen to accommodate religious objections generally. See Lynch, 465 U.S. 
at 673. 
 39. See generally Dwyer, The Children We Abandon, supra note 2 (arguing 
that religious exemptions to child welfare laws violate the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 40. Cf. Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 223–24 (Miss. 1979) (holding that 
religious exemption to school vaccination requirement would violate equal 
protection rights of third-party children). 
 41. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the 
Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 537–38, 538 n.354 (2005) (discussing 
this phenomenon). 
 42. Id. at 421. 
 43. As I read the Authors’ work, this effort is most evident in the 
“magnitude” prong of their medical neglect test. See Levin et al., supra note 3, at 
969 (suggesting that accommodations are disallowed where “society has [not] 
chosen to permit mainstream practices that are comparable to the religious 
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sympathetic and disappointed. I am sympathetic because I would 
prefer a Constitution which did not privilege the accommodation 
claims of parents who are religiously-motivated—this not because 
I do not respect religion but because I respect all sincerely-held 
conscience-based claims.44 I am also sympathetic because I would 
prefer a Constitution that recognized the right of all children to 
be launched into the rest of their lives as individuals and citizens 
with healthy, well-developed bodies and minds45—what they 
choose to do with those bodies and minds once they are launched 
and are unquestionably exercising autonomy, sans proxy, is 
finally their own business. I am disappointed because, at least in 
this work, the Authors do not develop these ideas. Rather, they 
                                                                                                     
conduct in question and that impose similar harms”). But it also shows in their 
earlier Establishment Clause discussion. See, e.g., id. at 964 (arguing that 
“religious accommodations that impose harms to children and third parties raise 
substantial questions under the Establishment Clause”); id. at 966 (requiring 
the government to intervene to protect children of religious minorities from 
severe harm if it also protects other children in these circumstances). 
 44. For example, I agree with what the Court wrote in Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944): 
If appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader protection than 
for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the great 
liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than 
the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. All are 
interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the 
modes appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the 
charger’s prime place because they have unity in their human sources 
and functionings. Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith 
and reasoned judgment are not the same. Spirit is not always 
thought. But in the everyday business of living, secular or otherwise, 
these variant aspects of personality find inseparable expression in a 
thousand ways. They cannot be altogether parted in law more than in 
life. 
Id. at 164. 
 45. In this respect too, I am a big fan of Prince and of its famous 
admonition: “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not 
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their 
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they 
can make that choice for themselves.” Id. at 170; see generally Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ 
Dilemma, 96 COL. L. REV. 1093 (1996) (arguing that the cultural defense to 
immigrant crime, including instances in which the latter is religiously-
motivated and as it effects children, is a violation of American anti-
discrimination norms). I am not, on the other hand, a fan of the Court’s 
application of this law to the Prince facts. 
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rest on the claim without more that “the yin and yang” of the 
religion clauses somehow requires these readings.46  
B. The Law’s Treatment of Religiously-Motivated Medical Neglect 
The Authors are undoubtedly correct that religious 
exemptions to medical neglect law that result in serious harm are 
“bad for children and society at large.”47 Nevertheless, their most 
problematic claim is that the law governing such accommodations 
is internally messy and unprincipled.48 This claim is problematic 
because it lacks relevant support and because, in fact, clear and 
principled law does exist in this area. Indeed, their proposed fix 
largely replicates that law. 
As I note in the Introduction, the Authors chose not to 
ground their argument in an analysis of medical neglect law; 
instead, they focus on the law governing accommodations in 
general. These choices caused them either to miss seeing or 
accounting for law that significantly complicates their claim. The 
three maltreatment-related accommodation fact patterns they do 
discuss—vaccinations,49 circumcision,50 and medical neglect51—
are illustrative. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled early on that 
vaccination mandates as prophylactic public health measures are 
valid exercises of the states’ police powers,52 including as against 
claims of parental rights. As the Court famously wrote in Prince 
v. Massachusetts, a “parent . . . cannot claim freedom from 
                                                                                                     
 46. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 965.  
 47. Id. at 955; see also id. at 966 (proposing a test to sort permissible from 
impermissible accommodations in this context). 
 48. See supra notes 7–17 and accompanying text (summarizing the 
Authors’ arguments in these respects). 
 49. Levin et al., supra note 3 at 1001–06. 
 50. Id. at 916, 989. To the extent that male circumcision would qualify as 
maltreatment, it would be as medical abuse, not neglect, but I include it here 
because the Authors have chosen to use it as an example of an accommodation 
that could be analyzed using their proposed medical neglect test. See also supra 
note 4 (reconciling the relevant language). 
 51. Levin et al., supra note 3 at 957. 
 52. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (upholding a 
state’s right to require vaccination of residents for smallpox).  
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compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on 
religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not 
include liberty to expose the community nor the child to 
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”53 
Consistent with this constitutional authority, all states have 
enacted vaccination mandates.54 Medical exemptions for 
individuals whose immune systems are weak to the point where 
vaccination is overly risky were read in almost immediately 
everywhere.55 Religious and other conscience-based exemptions 
were added later, typically in periods when the diseases at issue 
were under control and herd immunity was thought to have been 
achieved, so that the accommodations and free riding were 
viewed as low cost or even cost free.56 In other words, legislators 
have not tended to act in the face of “deadly diseases” or in 
circumstances where religious objectors were “putting at grave 
risk both their own children and other children who c[ould not] be 
successfully vaccinated.”57 The contemporary story is illustrative: 
As it has become apparent that some accommodations are no 
longer low cost or cost free, policymakers around the country 
                                                                                                     
 53.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see also Zucht v. 
King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922) (upholding a state’s right to make vaccination of 
schoolchildren mandatory). Notably, the Court recently denied certiorari in 
Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015), a hard-fought case 
which would have had it revisit its decisions in Jacobson and Zucht. Phillips v. 
City of New York, 136 S.Ct. 104 (2015). See also generally Erwin Chemerinsky 
and Michele Goodwin, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589 (2016) (setting out the history of 
compulsory vaccination laws and emphasizing their constitutionality). 
 54.  Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES (Jan. 27, 2016), 
http://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccination-exemptions (last 
visited July 16, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see 
also generally JARED P. COLE & KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, MANDATORY VACCINATIONS: PRECEDENT AND CURRENT LAWS 
(May 21, 2014) https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21414.pdf (providing an 
overview of mandatory vaccination laws). 
 55.  See Vaccination Exemptions, supra note 54; see also Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905) (suggesting this exception in dicta). 
 56.  See Kevin M. Malone and Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The 
Public Health Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
PRACTICE 262–63 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2009) (explaining the concept 
of herd immunity and the low cost of free riding where herd immunity has been 
achieved); id. at 273–80 (providing a history and analysis of religious 
exemptions to vaccination requirements); id. at 271 (providing a brief history of 
the use of schools as the vehicle to achieve herd immunity).  
 57.  Levin et al., supra note 3, at 949. 
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have advocated for new restrictions consistent with these 
developments,58 and there is some indication that administrators 
on the ground are interpreting their authority to restrict existing 
accommodations more broadly.59 The result has been a reduced 
incidence of disease.60 The effects of federalism aside,61 this is 
clearly not a messy story, nor is it an unprincipled one.  
In fact, although it is neither uniform nor unfailing, in 
general vaccination law’s accommodation of religion in contexts 
where harm is unlikely, and its efforts to restrict accommodations 
in contexts where the risk of harm is heightened, is entirely 
                                                                                                     
 58. See, e.g., Sarah Breitenbach, Here’s Why States Want to Make it Tough 
to Skip Childhood Vaccines, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/heres-why-states-want-to-make-it-tough-
to-skip-childhood-vaccines/ (last visited July 16, 2016) (noting the current public 
policy push to eliminate religious and philosophical exemptions to vaccination 
requirements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Saerom Yoo, 
Oregon One of Many States Seeking Tougher Vaccine Laws, STATESMAN J. (Mar. 
13, 2015), 
http://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/health/2015/03/14/oregon-one-
many-states-seeking-tougher-vaccine-laws/70317498/ (last visited July 16, 2016) 
(noting in 2015 that “15 states have introduced policies that would strengthen 
their school immunization requirements” and that “trends in statehouses across 
the country sow a motivation to clamp down on nonmedical exemptions”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 59.  See, e.g., Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(noting that a state department of education official inquired into the sincerity 
of a mother’s religious opposition to vaccination and ultimately denied her 
request for an exemption on that basis). 
 60.  See, e.g., Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (June 1, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html 
(last visited July 16, 2016) (providing a summary of the incidence of measles 
outbreaks in the United States from 2010 through approximately the first half 
of 2016, as these were connected with vaccination rates, and noting that in the 
first five months of 2016 there were 19 cases of measles as compared with a high 
of 667 in 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Liz Szabo, 
California Governor Signs Strict Law Requiring Vaccination for Most Kids, USA 
TODAY (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/06/30/california-vaccine-
bill/29485063/ (last visited July 16, 2016) (noting California’s decision to 
eliminate religious and personal exemptions following measles outbreak and 
providing data on rate of disease relative to herd immunity depending on state 
of the law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 61.  Federalism itself makes law messy, of course, and vaccination law is no 
exception. See supra note 55 (providing references to the states’ vaccination 
laws). The Authors affirm that the resulting inconsistencies are not what 
concern them. See Levin et al., supra note 3, at 961 (noting that “the law does, 
indeed must, tolerate all kinds of inconsistencies”). 
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consistent with the Authors’ overall approach and with their 
specific proposal that the government restrict practices that 
cause serious harm to in-group members or place unreasonable 
burdens on out-group members.62 
Male circumcision is governed by state law, and no state has 
yet prohibited the practice; it is legal without an accommodation 
everywhere in the country. Specifically, circumcision has long 
been considered to be a medical procedure whose benefits 
outweigh its inherent harms,63 and thus there has been no need 
for the law to develop an exception to abuse definitions for 
religiously-motivated parents. Given this, I am assuming that the 
Authors’ interest in the issue stems from the fact that the 
longstanding medical consensus has wavered in recent years,64 
and, as a result, the propriety of the procedure is increasingly 
subject to challenge. Although this challenge currently takes 
place on the cultural, academic, and ethical fronts65—the latter of 
which is of special importance to Professors Jacobs and Aurora, 
who are academic physicians and have written separately on the 
subject—it does suggest that legal actors might also need 
eventually to consider whether to accommodate parents who are 
                                                                                                     
 62.  Levin et al., supra note 3, at 966.  
 63.  See, e.g., Mike Stobbe, Circumcision Benefits Outweigh the Risk, CDC 
Says, TODAY HEALTH & WELLNESS (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.today.com/health/circumcision-benefits-outweigh-risks-cdc-says-
1D80331010 (last visited July 16, 2016) (describing this history and reaffirming 
the general consensus) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 64.  See id. (noting the growing “opposition from anti-circumcision advocacy 
groups”); see also Jacobs & Arora, Ritual Male Infant Circumcision, supra note 
3, at 30–31 (describing and countering medically and ethically-based opposition 
to male infant circumcision); Peter W. Adler, Is Circumcision Legal?, 16 RICH. 
J.L. & PUB. INT. 439, 442 (2013) (noting the shifting positions of the American 
Academy of Pediatrics and of “[s]ome foreign medical associations”). 
 65.  See, e.g., Chris Silva, To Circumcise or Not to Circumcise: A New 
Father’s Question, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/fashion/mens-style/circumcision-fatherhood-
dilemma.html?_r=0 (last visited July 16, 2016) (examining current cultural 
norms around circumcision) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Jacobs & Arora, supra note 3, at 30 (noting that academic “[o]pponents of male 
circumcision have increasingly used human rights positions to articulate their 
viewpoint”); Adler, supra note 65, at 443 (examining ethics of non-therapeutic 
circumcisions); British Medical Association, The Law and Ethics of Male 
Circumcision: Guidance for Doctors, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 259, 259–62 (2004) 
(summarizing non-therapeutic circumcision practices). 
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religiously (as opposed to medically or culturally) motivated.66 A 
discussion of this eventuality is beyond the scope of this 
Response. However, the Authors are certainly right that the 
discussion should include consideration of both the physical 
harm, pain, and injury at issue, and the extent to which these 
consequences are accommodated in other contexts so that any 
determination of circumcision’s legal status is equitable.67 To this 
                                                                                                     
 66.  This possibility seemed more realistic from 2007 to 2012, the period in 
which the American Academy of Pediatrics was reviewing the evidence in favor 
of and against circumcision, and in 2012, when it issued what some considered 
to be a “lukewarm” continued endorsement of the procedure. See American 
Academy of Pediatrics, Task Force on Circumcision, Circumcision Policy 
Statement, 130 PEDIATRICS 585, 585 (2012), available at 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/130/3/585 (“Although health 
benefits are not great enough to recommend routine circumcision for all male 
newborns, the benefits of circumcision are sufficient to justify access to this 
procedure for families choosing it and to warrant third-party payment for 
circumcision of male newborns.”); see also, e.g., Shawnee Barton, The 
Circumcision Wars: What’s a Parent to Do?, ATLANTIC (July 29, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/07/the-circumcision-wars-
whats-a-parent-to-do/278155/ (last visited July 16, 2016) (describing the AAP’s 
endorsement as “lukewarm”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). It was in this period that anti-circumcision activists in California 
garnered support for ballot measures that would ban circumcisions in some 
localities. Jennifer Medina, Efforts to Ban Circumcision Gain Traction in 
California, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/us/05circumcision.html?_r=0 (last visited 
July 16, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The CDC’s 
2014 affirmation of the historical consensus, see supra note 63 (discussing this 
affirmation), together with the traditional deference the law gives to parents to 
make medical decisions for their children within the range of reasonableness, 
see supra note 35 (discussing Supreme Court precedents upholding the rights of 
parents to make reasonable medical decisions), makes it unlikely that any state 
in this period would seek to prohibit standard forms of the practice. See, e.g., 
Gov. Brown Signs Bill to Prevent Male Circumcision Bans in California, CBS 
SFBAYAREA (Oct. 2, 2011), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/10/02/governor-
brown-signs-bill-to-prevent-male-circumcision-bans-in-california/ (last visited 
July 9, 2016) (reporting that the Governor’s action was based in the state’s 
authority to regulate medical practice and to protect religious liberty) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67.  Levin et al., supra note 3, at 966–67 (proposing the Authors’ test). In 
their earlier work, Jacobs and Arora suggest that comparisons should be made 
to accommodations for commonly accepted physical risk-taking and bodily injury 
such as participation in contact sports, elective aesthetic surgery, growth 
hormone, and ear piercing. Jacobs & Arora, supra note 3, at 36. I agree with this 
analysis. See Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 35, at 
555 (describing religiously-motivated circumcision and these other practices as 
“de facto exceptions” to child maltreatment laws). 
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I would add consideration of parental motivation. Although this 
is not doctrinally required, as a normative matter, it would make 
sense to ensure that the objective of the procedure was in the best 
interests of the child.68 Again, however, there is nothing about the 
legal story to date that is messy or unprincipled.69 
Medical neglect law is more complicated and thus it is not so 
easily summarized. In this respect, it might be described as 
messier than vaccination and circumcision law. On the other 
hand, like these, it is also generally consistent and principled, 
including in the Authors’ sense of the word. And with one 
exception,70 its terms generally mirror the Authors’ proposal for 
legal reform. 
The federal government and all of the states include medical 
neglect in their definitions of neglect.71 Medical neglect is 
typically defined as the failure to provide the child with necessary 
or adequate medical treatment, and as with all other forms of 
maltreatment, state intervention in the family to protect the child 
is authorized when the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering 
serious or life-threatening illness or injury as a result.72 
                                                                                                     
 68.  See Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 35, at 
545–52 (describing the boundaries of parents’ consent authority, the best 
interests presumption, and the physical abuse standard). 
 69.  The Authors flag “female genital alteration” as an issue in their 
introduction. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 916–17. They do not, however, discuss 
the relevant law, aspects of which could be considered messy and unprincipled. 
See generally Coleman, The Seattle Compromise, supra note 5 (discussing the 
practice and the legal reaction to it in the United States). 
 70.  See supra notes 34–46 and accompanying text (discussing the Authors’ 
argument that the Establishment Clause imposes an obligation on the 
government to act affirmatively to protect children from serious harm, and the 
expression of this argument in their proposed test). 
 71. See Definitions of Abuse and Neglect in Federal Law, CHILD WELFARE 
INFO. GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/can/defining/federal/ (last 
visited June 24, 2016) (providing federal definitions of abuse and neglect) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION 
GATEWAY, DEFINITIONS OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN STATE LAW 2 (2014) 
[hereinafter ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN STATE LAW], 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf#page=2&view=Types%20of%2
0abuse (setting out the states’ definitions of abuse and neglect). 
 72.  See generally ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN STATE LAW, supra note 71 
(providing state definitions of medical neglect). This standard for medical 
interventions in particular pre-dates CAPTA and is a significant feature of the 
traditional common law. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–
167 (1944) (noting that “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include 
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Consistent with the applicable federal mandate, all jurisdictions 
require reporting, investigation, and intervention in the family to 
protect children who are believed to be medically neglected or at 
risk of such.73 
Religious exemptions are commonly found in state statutes.74 
Unfortunately, the Authors mischaracterize the motivation 
underlying their adoption, and this causes them to misstate the 
scope of the exemptions’ effect. Specifically, it was not that 
“[s]tate legislatures . . . treated [religiously-motivated medical 
neglect] with astonishing solicitude,”75 but rather, as I note in the 
Introduction, that state legislatures were required by the federal 
government to include exemptions in their codes as a condition 
for receiving federal funds under the Child Prevention and 
Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA).76 Although this requirement 
                                                                                                     
liberty to expose . . . the child . . . to ill health or death”); State v. Perricone, 181 
A.2d 751, 760 (N.J. 1962) (upholding the right of the state to appoint a guardian 
to authorize necessary blood transfusions for a child against the wishes of his 
Jehovah’s Witness parents); cf. In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 390 (Penn. 1972) 
(summarizing the case law in the area and holding that the state’s interest does 
not override parental rights “when the child’s life is in no immediate danger”). 
 73. See ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN STATE LAW, supra note 71, at 3 (setting out 
reporting requirements). 
 74. See generally Religious Exemptions to Medical Treatment of Children 
in State Civil and Criminal Codes, CHILD, INC., 
http://childrenshealthcare.org/?page_id=24#Exemptions [hereinafter CHILD, 
INC.] (last visited June 24, 2016) (providing up-to-date information on applicable 
state and federal laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 75.  Levin et al., supra note 3, at 994 (noting also that the wide adoption of 
exemptions signifies that “virtually every state legislature has decided to accept 
greater risk to the health and life of children of religious parents”). 
 76.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text (introducing the federal 
mandate). The Child Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA) requires 
states receiving federal funds to protect children from maltreatment including 
from neglect. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
5101–5119c (2003)). In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) issued a regulation further conditioning the receipt of federal funds on 
the adoption of a religious exemption providing as follows:  
A parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who 
thereby does not provide specific medical treatment for a child for 
that reason alone shall not be considered a negligent parent or 
guardian; however, such an exception shall not preclude a court from 
ordering that medical services be provided to the child where his 
health requires it.  
45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1975). This mandate was rescinded in 1983. Child 
Abuse and Neglect Prevention Treatment Program, Final Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 
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was withdrawn in 1983,77 only a few states have gone through the 
reverse legislative process necessary to get their exemptions off 
the books. The states that retain them apparently do so for 
reasons ranging from an affirmative ideological or political 
commitment to the exemptions’ terms78—which is consistent with 
the Authors’ original suggestion—to inertia in the wake of both 
legislative and judicial qualifications and nullifications—which is 
not.79 
Where exemptions exist, they are contained in the civil code, 
the criminal code, or both; and, as the Authors note, they 
typically provide that parents cannot be held responsible for 
neglect solely on the basis that they have chosen to treat their 
children’s injuries and illnesses with prayer or other form of 
spiritual treatment.80 Consistent with the fact that most 
exemptions were enacted pursuant to federal mandate and not 
solicitude at the local level, and with the fact that the mandate 
                                                                                                     
3698–3704 (1983); see also Swan, supra note 1, at 58–61 (summarizing the 
history of the federal mandate); Maleka, supra note 1, at 246 (noting that most 
of the exemptions were enacted in response to [HEW] regulations”). Professor 
Levin recognizes this point in his earlier work, but then (as the Authors do here) 
he describes the states’ reaction as “astonishing solicitude . . . toward religious 
groups and individuals” rather than as the expected response to a federal 
mandate. Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3, 
at 1654. More generally, Levin makes a good case in that earlier work that the 
majoritarian branches of government have been more solicitous in this area 
than the courts; however, as I describe here, there is also a lot of evidence to the 
contrary that complicates his story. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (providing the 
exception in the federal regulation); infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text 
(noting the exceptions to the exemptions in related state statutes). 
 77.  See generally HHS Historical Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/about/historical-
highlights/index.html (last visited July 9, 2016) (noting this milestone) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 78.  A few states fall into this category. See CHILD, INC., supra note 74 
(noting that Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Ohio, and West Virginia stand out in this 
respect). 
 79.  Most states fall into this category. See infra note 82–83 and 
accompanying text (surveying the states and their exceptions to the 
exemptions). In between are states where political battles have been fought over 
the repeal of the exemptions. See PETERS, supra note 2, at 15–18 (describing 
these battles). 
 80.  See supra note 76 (setting out the relevant part of the regulation); 
Levin et al., supra note 3, at 79 (describing the standard exemption); see also 
Swan, supra note 1, at 80–82 (providing examples of different state statutes, 
including their locations in the code and limitations). 
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itself included the condition that the exemptions “shall not 
preclude a court from ordering that medical services be provided 
to the child where his health requires it,”81 they typically do not 
prevent Child Protective Services (CPS) and the courts from 
acting to protect children who are believed to have been medically 
neglected or who are at risk of such, especially when the 
children’s circumstances are emergent and life threatening.82 In 
some states this important qualification is set out as it was in the 
federal regulation: as an exception to the exemption in the code 
itself.83 In others it has been read in by courts interpreting the 
                                                                                                     
 81. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1975). 
 82. Importantly, they also typically do not insulate others who are not 
parents from their legal obligations to report and investigate suspected medical 
neglect. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2015) (providing that the exemption 
does not alter mandated reporters’—including parents’—duty to report “if a lack 
of medical care may cause serious danger to the child’s health”); Mo. REV. STAT. 
§ 210.115 (2015) (providing that exemption does not alter the state’s authority to 
“accept reports concerning such a child and may subsequently investigate or 
conduct a family assessment as a result of that report”); see also generally ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT IN STATE LAW, supra note 71, at 4 (noting that although a majority 
of state statutes include a religious exemption in their reporting requirement, 
the provisions’ caveats and conditions mean that, in effect, fewer than a 
majority of states absolve mandated reporters of their obligations in this 
context). 
 83.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.2 (2015) (providing that the exemption 
“shall not preclude a court from ordering that medical services be provided to 
the child when the child’s heath requires it”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-103 (2015) 
(“[T]he religious rights of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian shall not limit 
access of a child to medical care in a life threatening situation or when the 
condition will result in serious disability”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (2015) 
(“[The] exception does not: 1. Eliminate the requirement that such a case be 
reported to the department; 2. Prevent the department from investigating such 
a case; or 3. Preclude a court from ordering, when the health of the child 
requires it . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-107.R49-5-180 (2015) (providing the 
same language as Colorado’s statute); IOWA CODE § 232.68 (2015) (providing the 
same language as Alabama’s statute); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020 (providing 
that the exemption “shall not preclude a court from ordering necessary medical 
services for a child”); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. ART. § 603 (2014) (providing that the 
exemption does not “prohibit the court from ordering medical services for the 
child when there is substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare”); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.634 (2015) (providing that the exemption “shall not 
preclude a court from ordering the provision of medical services or nonmedical 
remedial services recognized by state law to a child where the child’s health 
requires it nor does it abrogate the responsibility of a person required to report 
child abuse or neglect”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (2016) (providing that, 
notwithstanding exemption, “if lack of medical care may result in serious danger 
to the child’s health, the local welfare agency may ensure that necessary 
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exemption’s “solely” or “that reason alone” language,84 or results 
from judicial decisions finding the exemptions inapplicable or 
                                                                                                     
medical services are provided to the child”); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.115 (2015) 
(providing that the exemption does not alter the state’s authority to “accept 
reports concerning such a child and may subsequently investigate or conduct a 
family assessment as a result of that report” or “to ensure that medical services 
are provided to the child when the child’s heath requires it”); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-3-102 (2015) (providing that the exemption “may not be construed to limit 
the administrative or judicial authority of the state to ensure that medical care 
is provided to the child when there is imminent substantial risk of serious harm 
to the child”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (2014) 
providing that the exemption “does not abrogate or limit any person’s 
responsibility . . . to report . . . child neglect that is known or 
reasonably suspected or believed to have occurred, and children who 
are known to face or are reasonably suspected or believed to be facing 
a threat of suffering . . . neglect and does not preclude any exercise of 
the authority of the state, any political subdivision, or any court to 
ensure that medical or surgical care or treatment is provided to a 
child when the child’s health requires the provision of medical or 
surgical care or treatment” 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. 10A § 1-1-105 (2016) (providing that the exemption does not 
“prevent a court from immediately assuming custody of a child and ordering 
whatever action may be necessary, including medical treatment, to protect the 
child’s health or welfare”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6304 (2014) (providing 
that, where exemption applies, the “county agency shall closely monitor the 
child and the child’s family and shall seek court-ordered medical intervention 
when the lack of medical or surgical care threatens the child’s life or long-term 
health”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-5 (2015) (providing that the exemption does 
not “preclude the court from ordering medical services or nonmedical services 
recognized by the laws of this state to be provided to the child where his or her 
health requires it”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (2015) (providing the same 
language as Alabama’s exemption). 
 84.  See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 852 (Cal. 1988) 
(holding that “child welfare statutes providing that children receiving treatment 
by prayer shall not ‘for that reason alone’ be considered abused or neglected did 
not evince legislative sanction for prayer treatment of children in life-
threatening circumstances”); In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27–28 (Cal. App. 
3d 1987), which held that “[t]he purpose of [the exemption] appears to be rather 
limited,” that “[i]t simply identifies one factor to be considered by the juvenile 
court,” and that  
[i]t clearly does not preclude the court, exercising its ‘very extensive 
discretion in determining what will be in the best interests of a child’ 
from concluding that spiritual treatment alone is not sufficient to 
arrest a danger which otherwise requires that dependency be 
declared in order that the minor can receive conventional medical 
treatment deemed more likely to succeed. 
Id.; People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he meaning 
of the statutory language, ‘for that reason alone,’ is quite clear. It allows a 
finding of dependency and neglect for other reasons,’ such as where the child’s 
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invalid on other grounds.85 Either way, the effect is that the 
longstanding common law rule typically continues to operate: 
even in jurisdictions with exemptions, the state still can 
intervene in the family to protect children from medical neglect 
that causes or risks serious illness or injury.86 
To be clear, this does not mean that accommodations are 
ineffective or innocuous. Many children have died or suffered 
serious injury as a result of religiously-motivated medical 
neglect.87 The law is not the direct cause of these harms, of 
course; but it has surely served and surely continues to serve a 
powerful expressive function that lends indirect support to 
religiously-motivated parents’ practices, even when these 
formally cross the line from legal to illegal. 
In general, this is because parents’ Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty, which is already quite significant, is enhanced when it is 
religiously motivated.88 This is simultaneously a reflection and 
                                                                                                     
life is in imminent danger despite any treatment by spiritual means.”) 
 85.  See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1114 (Del. 1991) 
(applying the best interests balancing test to determine whether the state could 
force Christian Scientist parents to accept medical treatment for a child with 
cancer because of concerns that the statutory exemption violated the 
Establishment Clause). 
 86.  See supra note 72 (discussing the states’ ability to intervene in 
exemption cases). For example, hospitals still routinely act to assure that 
Jehovah’s Witness children receive life-saving blood transfusions. See, e.g., 
Niebla v. San Diego, 967 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the argument that 
giving a child a necessary blood transfusion despite the parents’ objection 
violates the parents’ constitutional rights); In re Elisha McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 
411 (Mass. 1991) (same); J.V. v. State, 516 So.2d 1133 (Fla. App. 1987) (same). 
And CPS still routinely acts on reports that Christian Scientist children and 
children of other religious minorities are not receiving life-saving medical care. 
See, e.g., In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (rejecting argument that requiring 
parents to follow physician’s cancer treatment recommendations violated 
parents’ religious freedom); In re Pamela Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. 
1983) (holding that child’s right to cancer treatment outweighs father’s free 
exercise right); see also People in Interest of D. L. E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) 
(holding that state can intervene to protect a child whose “life is in imminent 
danger” as a result of parent’s refusal to provide conventional medical treatment 
on religious grounds). 
 87. See PETERS, supra note 2, at 11–14 (discussing this history). 
 88.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (noting this point 
in the context of Amish parents’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164–65 (1945) (noting this point in the 
context of a Jehovah’s Witness guardian’s First and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims).  
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reinforcement of important political and cultural norms about 
parental autonomy, and in particular about the relative rights of 
religiously- and other-motivated parents to raise their children as 
they see fit without state intervention. As a result, many 
mandated reporters, CPS, and courts exercising lawful discretion 
are likely to be more sensitive about whether and how to intrude 
in the family to protect a child who is believed to have suffered or 
to be at risk of suffering religiously-motivated medical neglect. 
Sometimes not enough may be done to protect children in these 
circumstances because—even as it draws a formal line at serious 
and certainly life-threatening neglect—the law sends a 
particularly strong message about the sanctity of religious 
families. 
Where they exist, statutory exemptions both reinforce this 
general message and provide important specificity which is 
missing from the definitive source: they signal that even in the 
absence of a Supreme Court free exercise decision on point, at 
least statutorily parental liberty to raise one’s child in one’s 
religion does include the right to choose spiritual treatment for 
illness and injury.89 Notwithstanding the limitations built into 
this right,90 some prosecutors, judges, and juries have had 
difficulty finding parents criminally blameworthy or subjecting 
them to incarceration for the harm that their religious 
(objectively good) intentions caused their children.91 Although 
state actors do not typically hesitate to intervene in a family to 
protect an at-risk child and to supervise the family following a 
child’s death in this context,92 to the extent that criminal 
                                                                                                     
 89.  As the Authors argue, this is an example of “[t]he majoritarian 
branches of government . . . go[ing] far beyond what the Supreme Court has 
required in accommodating religious freedom.” Levin et al., supra note 3, at 940; 
see also Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3, at 
1654 (“These accommodations are wholly the creature of statute. In neither the 
vaccination nor the medical treatment context have the federal courts 
interpreted the Constitution to require such accommodations . . . .”). 
 90.  See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (discussing and citing to 
exceptions to the exemptions). 
 91.  See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 2, at 3–14 (describing the facts and 
proceedings in the Heilmans case as an illustration of this phenomenon and 
detailing the difficulties inherent in prosecuting these cases generally). 
 92.  See, e.g., id. at 8 (providing a poignant illustration of this tendency). 
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sanctions express the community’s special moral outrage, they 
may be missing as a result the exemptions.93 
It is not clear that the Authors would have it differently. 
They share the law’s commitments to accommodations so long as 
the state lacks evidence that a child is suffering or at risk of 
suffering serious harm, and to intervention in the family to 
protect the child where such evidence exists. And although they 
appear concerned that parents who have avoided discovery until 
it is too late may not always be successfully prosecuted or 
incarcerated, their proposal for reform focuses—as current law 
does—on protecting children not punishing parents. There are 
excellent arguments on both sides of this issue,94 but to me, at 
least, this focus makes sense. Punishing parents may have some 
indirect and incremental effect on child protection.95 However, 
the prosecutions are complicated and also politically fraught,96 
and they risk different harm to the family’s remaining children, 
many if not most of whom are likely to be better off if their 
parents are supervised but not in jail.97 Finally, although ongoing 
supervision is not as attention-grabbing as a prosecution, this 
strategy is not without its own expressive power. 
IV. Conclusion 
In the end, the Authors suggest that their approach to 
medical neglect cases may provide a useful template for resolving 
questions about the propriety of accommodations in other 
contexts. For example, they suggest that it might apply to “the 
debate over whether sexual orientation non-discrimination laws 
                                                                                                     
 93.  See id. at 14 (discussing advocates Rita Swan and Seth Asser’s 
“insist[ence] that dozens of lives would be saved every year if local authorities 
zealously and consistently enforced criminal neglect, manslaughter, and 
criminally negligent homicide statutes against spiritual healers”). 
 94.  See id. 
 95.  See id. 
 96.  See id. at 14–18. 
 97.  See generally Michael Wald, Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” 
Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975) (arguing 
that state intervention on behalf of maltreated children also causes harm that 
must be balanced against their parents’ actions as decisions are made about 
their continuing care). 
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should accommodate religious dissent.”98 Although they do not 
develop this particular application, they are generally thoughtful 
in their consideration of both the merits and limitations of future 
extrapolations. To these careful considerations I suggest the 
following additional caveat. 
The Authors’ template is based on a premise, which holds 
that “a religious practice that imposes significant costs or harms 
on participants in the practice or on third parties should not be 
tolerated, but that in the absence of such harm, we should be 
entirely accommodating of religious minorities’ deviations from 
general social and legal expectations.”99 They call this “American 
baseline accommodationism,” and they characterize it as 
“noncontroversial.”100 As applied to medical neglect cases, this 
baseline premise results in “a default rule that religious practices 
should be respected unless they unduly interfere with the real 
and measurable interests of children within the religion and 
others outside the religious group.”101 As I have described, 
medical neglect law generally reflects the Authors’ proposed rule 
in these respects. 
The Authors’ take on what medical neglect law should be, 
and why, makes sense as a matter of principle because the parties 
at issue are parents who are presumed to be acting in their 
children’s best interests, their children who are viewed in law as 
being one with their parents, and the state which has authority 
to intervene in the parent-child relationship only when it appears 
that the best interests presumption may be rebutted. This same 
take makes a lot less sense—indeed, I would argue none at all—
in circumstances where there is no similar operative 
presumption; this includes situations where third parties and 
constitutionally significant harms are at issue.  
Thus, although the Authors are correct that certain 
measures featured in their test—including direct effects, indirect 
effects, and magnitude—are applicable beyond medical neglect, 
as a matter of different principle the test used to determine when 
                                                                                                     
 98.  Levin et al., supra note 3, at 913; see also id. at 1007 (discussing the 
harms of sexual orientation non-discrimination laws). 
 99.  Id. at 947. 
 100. Id. 
 101.  Id. at 966. 
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the best interests presumption is overcome so that the state can 
recognize the child as having separate, protectable interests 
should not be the test used to determine when the state can 
recognize and protect the constitutional rights of autonomous 
individuals—such as the religiously-motivated and same-sex 
couples—who stand as equals in the first instance. Children may 
be “the Achilles heel of liberalism,”102 but the law otherwise 
treats as equal all those who wish “to marry, establish a home 
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of 
[their] own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges 
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit 
of happiness by free men.”103 Like the Constitution, real 
American baseline accommodationism does not require the law to 
privilege the individual who wishes “to worship God according to 
the dictates of his own conscience” and to discriminate in his 
favor (via presumptions or otherwise) against the individual who 
wishes “to marry, establish a home and bring up children.” What 
this means is that to remain noncontroversial, baseline 
accommodationism has to define its tipping points—”significant 
costs or harms” and “undue interference”—automatically to 
include competing constitutional rights, or it has to be revised 
consistent with the majoritarian sense that “the state’s 
interest . . . in prohibiting . . . discrimination overrides the 
general commitment to accommodationism.”104 
 
                                                                                                     
 102.  Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 41, at 421. 
 103.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2593, 2597–99 (2015) (holding that state laws banning 
same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). 
 104.  Levin et al., supra note 3, at 944. 
